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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIIINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND HAROLD SHEPHERD
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
Singer v. State, Ind., 142 N. E. 864. Inference from intent from negligent
driving of automobile.
Where an auto driver drove his car at a speed of 50 miles an hour on a
much used public highway, just at dusk, such conduct created a reasonable
inference, in prosecution for assault and battery, that driver was acting with a
reckless disregard for the safety of others, and with a willingness to inflict
injury.
In a trial for assault and battery for driving a car in collision with a wagon,
evidence held to show unlawful intent to commit the offense.
AUTOMOBILES.
Comnwnwealth v. Pentz, Mass., 143 N. E. 322. Reckless driving: ascertain-
able standard of guilt.
G. L. c. 90, sec. 24, making it an offense to operate an automobile so that
the lives or safety of the public might be endangered, is not invalid as establish-
ing no standard of conduct sufficiently definite to inform a person charged with
its violation of the nature and extent of his offense.
CONFESSION.
Omohundro v. Cononwnwealth, Virginia, 121 S. E. 908. Voluntary character
of confession a question of fact for the trial court.
Where the question whether the confession was a voluntary one is raised it
is the function of the court to determine that matter as a question of fact and
a finding of the trial court is entitled to the same weight and effect as is given
to a finding of fact by a jury.
CRUELTY TO CHILDREN.
Richardson v. State Board of Control, N. J., 123 Atl. 720. Legality of
statute providing for summary punishment.
If Act April 8, 1915 (P. L. p. 441; Comp. St. Supp. 1911-1915, p. 802, Sec. 9),
providing that persons guilty of cruelty to children may be punished in a sum-
mary proceeding, is intended to provide for the punishment of an assault and
battery, it is unconstitutional to that extent. Such crime being indictable at
common law, and punishable by fine and imprisonment or both, cannot be pun-
ished in a summary proceeding.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
State v. Rountree, South Carolina, 121 S. E. 205.
To constitute a valid plea of -"double jeopardy" the defendant must have
been tried on a valid indictment and a jury impaneled in a court having juris-
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diction, consequently where the defendant was tried in a magistrate's court for
grand larceny and housebreaking and under the constitution the jurisdiction of
such courts did not extend to felonies, the prior trial was a mere nullity and the
defendant not put in jeopardy.
EXTRADITION.
Cockburn v. Willmin, Sheriff, Missouri, 257 S. W. 458. One leaving one
state after indictment is a "fugitive from justice" regardless of purpose in
leaving.
The petitioner who had previously served in the U. S. Army was indicted in
Iowa for obtaining money under false pretenses. Subsequently he applied to
the Veteran's Bureau for permit to enter and to receive treatment in a govern-
ment hospital for diabetes. The permit was granted and petitioner assigned to
the government hospital at Jefferson Barracks in Missouri. While there under-
going treatment requisition was made by the governor of Iowa for his return.
In habeas corpus proceedings it was contended for the petitioner that the cir-
cumstances under which he had left the State of Iowa negatived his being a
"fugitive from justice." It was. held, that the purpose in leaving one state after
being indicted could not be considered and that one so leaving is a "fugitive
from justice" within Const. U. S. Art. 4 S. 2 and U. S. Comp. St. 10126 relating
to extradition, regardless of purpose.
FALSE PRETENSES.
People v. Abbott, Calif., D. C. A., 223 Pac. 77. False pretense telating to
intoxicating liquor in which property rights not recognized.
In a prosecution for obtaining money by "false pretenses," in that defendant
had sold to the prosecuting witness a number of barrels containing colored water
upon representations that they contained whisky, held, that defendant could not
avoid liability on the theory that there was no longer any property rights in the
whisky, and that the prosecuting witness must be presumed to have known
such fact and was not entitled to rely on the false representations, since such
representations were of fact and not of law, and the basis of the charge being
a misrepresentation of a material fact with knowledge thereof and intent to
defraud.
State v. Antoine, La., 98 So. 861. Obtaining nwney through promises to
disclose hiddem treasure, not within false pretene statute.
Defendant represented that he could obtain a magic or mineral rod which
would locate beneath the surface of the earth, hidden treasure; that he would
produce the rod within 30 days and would then locate hidden treasures of great
value and would divide the same with those parties, who upon the strength of
the representations gave him money. Held, in sustaining a judgment maintain-
ing a motion to quash the indictment that sec. 813 Rev. Sts. (the false pretense
statute) was merely declaratory of the common law which required a false state-
ment by the accused of a past event or an existing fact and excluded any
representation in regard to a future transaction.
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FALSE ADVERTISEMENT.
Commonwealth v. Reilly, Mass., 142 N. E. 915. Validity of statute: ascer-
tainable standard of guilt.
G. L. c. 266, sec. 91, making it an offense to make representations or state-
ments of fact which might "on reasonable investigation have been ascertained
to be untrue" in advertisement, is not unconstitutional as failing to conform to
the requirements of Constitution, Declaration of Rights, pt. 1, art. 12, requiring
an ascertainable standard of guilt.
G. L. c. 266, sec. 91, making it a crime to misrepresent facts in advertise-
ments, is a valid exercise of the police power and does not offend against any
guaranty of the Constitution of the United States.
HomcIIDE.
State v. Oxendine, North Carolina, 122 S. E. 568. Where one engaged in a
fight with the defendant kills a bystander, defendant cannot be guilty of man-
slaughter.
A provoked a fight with B in which both A and B used their pistols. In
the course of the fight, B accidentally shot and killed C, a bystander. The trial
court charged the jury that under such facts A would be guilty of manslaughter.
Held, on appeal that the instruction was erroneous. The court quotes with
approval from Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641, "Where the criminal liability arises
from the act of another, it must appear that the act was done in furtherance of
the common design or in prosecution of the common purpose for which the
parties were assembled or conspired together." Under the state of facts as-
sumed by the instruction in the principal case it is quite evident that A and B
were not acting in concert nor was the homicide committed in furtherance of a
common design or purpose.
INDICTMENT.
People v. Brow, Ill., 143 N. E. 440. Effect of plea of guilty to crime not
charged in indictment.
A defendant charged in an indictment with a crime cannot be lawfully con-
victed, whether on a trial or on his plea of guilty, of any crime not charged in
the indictment.
A defendant charged with setting fire to a courthouse with the intent to burn
and destroy it, in violation of Cr. Code, div. 1, sec. 16, as amended by laws 1919,
p. 428, could not be given sentence of imprisonment in penitentiary for a term
not less than 1 year or more than 20 years, prescribed by section 13, for will-
fully and maliciously causing a courthouse to be burned, though defendant
entered a plea of "guilty to the crime of arson as charged in the indictment."
LARCENY.
Commonwealth v. Novick, Mass., 142 N. E. 771. Partner: property of
another.
At common law a general partner could not be convicted of larceny or
embezzlement for appropriating to his own use money which came into his
possession by virtue of his being such partner and joint owner, because it was
not "the property of another."
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Under G. L. c. 266, Secs. 58, 59, an officer of a voluntary association or
society who converts money which has come into his possession by, virtue of his
office is guilty of larceny, although he is a member of the organization and, as
such, entitled to an interest in the property thereof, and it is immaterial whether
or not members are civilly liable as co-partners; this applying to a society
organized for the purpose of enabling its members to obtain loans from money
raised by selling its capital shares, in view of G. L. c. 182, Sec. 1.
People v. Barnes, Ill., 143 N. E. 445. Passenger riding in stolen automobile,
having reason to know of the theft, not an accessory.
Although passenger in stolen automobile had reasonable ground to suspect
that driver had stolen the automobile when she entered the automobile and rode
with driver, she could not be convicted of larceny of the automobile as a prin-
cipal, on theory that she was an accessory before the fact, not having by
affirmative act actually advised, encouraged, aided, or abetted the perpetration
of the crime.
Aiding, abetting, or assisting are affirmative in their character, and it is not
sufficient that there is a mere negatve acquiescence not in any way made known
to the principal malefactor.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS.
McCray v. State, Texas, 257 S. W. 566. Prosecuting attorney's statement as
to leniency of juries in crimintal cases, improper.
Where the prosecuting attorney in a homicide case made the following state-
ments to -the jury, it was held, inter alia, reversible error: "The juries in Har-
rison County are inclined to be lenient in the trials of men for murder and
have too often permitted their sympathy for defendants to influence them and
as a result men who have committed unwarranted and unjustifiable murder have
been set free by the verdict of the jury, and as a result life in Harrison County
is cheaper than any other place in all this country; it is cheaper than a bale of
cotton, cheaper than a mule, cheaper than dirt and even cheaper than a dog."
SENTENCE.
Croswell v. People, Colo., 223 Pac. 51. Statute relating to ninors construed.
While criminal statutes must be strictly construed and any ambiguity re-
solved in defendant's favor, they should not be so construed as to destroy the
evident intention of the legislature.
Under C. L. 1921, Sec. 7123, requiring that males over 16 and under 21 con-
victed of felony for the first time be sentenced to the state reformatory, unless
convicted of "crimes involving the penalty of imprisonment for life," murder or
voluntary manslaughter, in which case they shall be sentenced to the state
penitentiary, such a person convicted of robbery with a gun, which is punishable
under section 6718 by imprisonment in the penitentiary for-life or not less than
10 years, may be sentenced to the penitentiary for such a term of years; life
imprisonment being "involved" when such penalty "may" be inflicted.
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SENTENCE.
State v. Birbiglia, La., 99 So. 462. One failing to serve sentence through
error may be made to do so, although term has expired.
The defendant on May 11th 1923, after conviction of an offense, was sen-
tenced to pay a fine of $100.00 and serve 30 days in prison. By error of the
clerk the commitment read in the alternative. Defendant paid the fine and was
subsequently released. On Jan. 7th, 1924, the error of the clerk was discovered,
the district attorney applied for a new commitment and the defendant im-
prisoned. In habeas corpus proceedings held, that the defendant, upon discovery
of the error could be compelled to serve the sentence through the term for which
he should have served had then expired. The court recognizes a line of cases
opposed to its own view which turn on the ground that an order of commitment
made after the time of imprisonment named in the sentence has expired is void
for want of jurisdiction, but-concludes after an examination of the authorities
that its own view is supported by the greater number of cases.
TRIAL.
Commonwealth v. Trinkle, Pa., 124 Atl. 191. Effect of conthuance of trial
at home of witness.
In a prosecution for murder, the court did not abuse its discretion in con-
tinuing the place of trial to the home of a material eyewitness at the county
seat, such witness being too ill to be moved, which fact was not known until
the case was called for trial at the courthouse and after the jury had been
impaneled and some of the witnesses heard, all the formalities of the law in
taking the testimony of such witness being observed, and all members of the
court and such members of the public as were able to gain admission, being
present, and such removal did not violate defendant's constitutional right to a
fair and public trial; a "public trial" meaning a trial, other matters being equal,
where there is no restriction as to admission, except the size of the room where
the trial is conducted. And there is no statute which in terms states that a
court must be held in the courthouse; Act of April 14, 1834, Secs. 58, 65, 66
(P. L. 352, 353; Pa. St. 1920, Secs. 18314, 17250, 17251), only creating an infer-
ence to the effect that the courthouse is the lawful place for trial.
In a murder prosecution, the removal of the trial to the home of a witness
who was too ill to attend was not objectionable as tending to impress the jury
with the truthfulness of the testimony of the witness, and the fact that the wit-
ness was surrounded by images and fixtures indicating her faith to be Roman
Catholic, and that she held in her hand the crucifix and beads, and that there
were members of the jury of the same faith who were more likely to be
impressed with her testimony under these circumstances, did not constitute
error; such being circumstances of a trial which cannot be obviated.
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